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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge 
 
 Elvin Wrensford and Craig Muller (“Defendants”) 
were convicted of federal and territorial crimes arising from a 
May 10, 2012 shooting in Christiansted, St. Croix.  
Defendants appeal the District Court’s orders denying their 
motions to suppress evidence, the admission at trial of out-of-
court identifications, orders denying their motions for 
mistrials based on the jury poll, and the refusal to give a 
voluntary manslaughter jury instruction.  Muller also 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him.   
 
 Because Wrensford was de facto arrested when, 
without probable cause, he was transported from the location 
where police found him to a police station and placed in a 
cell, we will vacate and remand to the District Court to 
determine whether (1) an exception to the Fourth Amendment 
applies and renders the evidence admissible, or (2) a new trial 
is warranted.  As to Muller, we will affirm the District 
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Court’s judgment because (1) he waived his challenge to the 
suppression rulings, (2) the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion by admitting the eyewitness identification, polling 
the jury and instructing it to redeliberate, or refusing to give a 
voluntary manslaughter jury instruction, and (3) the District 
Court correctly concluded that the evidence was sufficient to 
support the jury’s verdict against him. 
 
I 
 
A 
 
 Wrensford and Muller were involved in an altercation 
with a man at Ben’s Car Wash on the afternoon of May 10, 
2012.  A few hours later, the man returned to the car wash 
with Gilbert Hendricks, apparently looking for someone.  
Hendricks and the man left, but Hendricks returned to the car 
wash at around 8:00 p.m.  Shortly after he arrived, a red truck 
passed in front of the car wash and, moments later, the truck 
turned around and chased Hendricks down the road toward 
Food Town, a local supermarket.  The passenger, who was 
later identified as Wrensford, fired several shots at Hendricks.  
Hendricks died two days later from gunshot wounds to his 
head.   
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B1 
 
 Several officers responded to the scene at around 8:06 
p.m.  Witnesses told Officer Julio Mendez that a red truck left 
the area at a high speed.  Mendez drove in the direction the 
truck was observed going, and 45 minutes later, he 
encountered two men walking on the road.  Mendez stopped 
in front of them and noticed that both were sweating 
profusely; one said they were coming from a basketball court 
in the area.  Mendez called for backup, and before he could 
approach them, both men ran.  One ran into the bushes and 
the other ran toward a gas station.  Mendez radioed a general 
description of the men to other officers.   
 
 Officer Leon Cruz was patrolling after the shooting 
when, at 8:46 p.m., he heard the transmission from Mendez 
stating that two “black, rasta males” were on the run.  App. 
358-59.  (Cruz testified that “rasta” means a person who has 
dreadlocks.  App. 428-29.)  Cruz thereafter observed a man 
wearing a white shirt running across the street toward a 
ballpark.  Cruz turned toward the ballpark and saw a “rasta 
guy” standing near the bush area.  App. 362-63.  He also saw 
a white shirt hanging in the bushes.  At approximately 8:58 
p.m., Cruz drew his gun, ordered the individual—
Wrensford—to show his hands and get on the ground, and 
once another officer arrived, Cruz placed Wrensford in 
handcuffs.  Cruz patted Wrensford down and removed a 
knife, keys to a GMC truck, a wallet, and an insurance card 
                                                                
1 Because Wrensford’s motion to suppress is central to 
this appeal, the facts in Section B are drawn largely from the 
evidence presented at the suppression hearing.  Many of these 
facts were also presented at trial. 
6 
 
from Wrensford’s pockets.  Wrensford was then transported 
to the “C Command” police station in a police vehicle at 
around 9:06 p.m. and placed in a cell.  Officers later returned 
to the area where Wrensford was stopped and recovered a 
Smith & Wesson 9 mm pistol close to where he had been 
standing.  Shortly after Wrensford was detained, Mendez 
notified the other officers that a red GMC truck had been 
found, partially hidden in bushes, next to an abandoned 
building.   
 At the scene of the shooting, Detective Kirk 
Fieulleteau spoke to two witnesses: Tynicia Teague and her 
father, Trevor Teague, who were in the Food Town parking 
lot during the shooting and said they were able to identify the 
shooter.  Fieulleteau decided to speak with the witnesses at C 
Command, so he asked a fellow officer, Lydia Figueroa, to 
take Wrensford from C Command to the Rainbow Building 
police station in Frederiksted.  Fieulleteau went to the station 
and found Wrensford in a cell.  Fieulleteau took Wrensford’s 
driver’s license and then he, Figueroa, and another officer 
escorted Wrensford outside while handcuffed and placed him 
in a police car in front of the station.  Fieulleteau testified that 
he did not want the witnesses “to have any sort of inadvertent 
interaction with him.”  App. 659. 
 
 Tynicia and Trevor Teague arrived at C Command at 
around 9:55 p.m.  As Wrensford was being taken out of the 
station and into the car, which was a few steps from the 
station’s front door, Tynicia Teague was waiting at a traffic 
light outside the station.  She looked toward C Command and 
observed Wrensford being put into the police car.  The 
Teagues thereafter entered the police station and met with the 
police.  Before Fieulleteau had formally commenced the 
interview with Tynicia Teague, she “blurted out” that she saw 
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the shooter, referring to Wrensford, being taken out of the 
station.  App. 600.  Trevor Teague told Officer Richard 
Matthews “the same thing.”  App. 661.  Tynicia Teague then 
provided a statement concerning the shooting, and when 
shown Wrensford’s driver’s license, she confirmed that he 
was the shooter and the person she saw outside the station.   
 
 Matthews met with Wrensford later that night at 
Rainbow Building.  At 12:23 a.m., Matthews read Wrensford 
his Miranda rights, and Wrensford acknowledged his rights 
but did not sign the Miranda waiver form.  Wrensford told 
Matthews that he was playing basketball that evening in the 
Princess area with “a partner of his,” but he declined to give 
his partner’s name.  App. 509.  While being booked at 
approximately 1:30 a.m. on May 11, Wrensford agreed to 
provide a DNA sample.   
 
 Tynicia Teague also said she saw the truck’s driver.  
Three days after the shooting, she was shown a photo array 
that included Muller’s photo and she identified him as the 
driver.  She said that prior to the shooting, she had seen 
Muller with Wrensford.   
 
C 
 
 At trial, Muller’s grandfather testified concerning 
Muller’s actions and whereabouts after the shooting.  Muller 
began staying with his grandfather on the fourth day after the 
shooting.  Muller told his grandfather that he was ill, 
considered not going to work, and planned to travel to New 
York to see his mother and a doctor.  Notably, two of his co-
workers testified that Muller never mentioned that he was 
feeling ill or planning to leave St. Croix.  Rather, one of 
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Muller’s co-workers testified that he overheard co-workers 
asking Muller whether he was involved in the shooting (they 
heard that he was).  Muller’s supervisor testified that, after 
the shooting, Muller asked to be reassigned to work in a 
different area of the island, because “he had a situation.”  
App. 1920-21. 
 
 Just four days after he began living with his 
grandfather, Muller left St. Croix and traveled to the San 
Juan, Puerto Rico airport, where he was met by Tomas 
Garcia, a Customs and Border Protection officer.  Garcia 
testified that he approached Muller from behind and told him 
he was “there to pick him up.”  App. 1544.  Muller “lowered 
his head and shoulders” and “said that’s okay.  I figured 
somebody was going to pick [me] up.”  App. 1544.  Garcia 
handcuffed him and advised him that he would be detained 
“on some business that he had in St. Croix . . . .”  App. 1544.  
Garcia escorted Muller to an inspection area and asked 
whether Muller knew of any issues or problems in St. Croix.  
Muller then “broke down crying,” App. 1545, and returned to 
St. Croix.   
 
D 
 
 Wrensford and Muller were charged with: 
(1) possession of a firearm in a school zone, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 922(q)(2)(A) and 924(a)(1)(B) (Count I); (2) using 
a firearm during a violent crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) (Count II); (3) first degree murder, in 
violation of 14 V.I. Code §§ 922(a)(1) and 923(a) (Count IV); 
and (4) unauthorized possession of a firearm, in violation of 
14 V.I. Code § 2253(a) (Count V).  In addition, Wrensford 
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was charged with possession of a firearm with an obliterated 
serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (Count III).   
 
 Wrensford moved to suppress items found in his 
possession, the statements he made to law enforcement, 
identifications made by Tynicia and Trevor Teague, and his 
DNA sample.  Muller moved to suppress any identification 
evidence.  The District Court granted Wrensford’s motion to 
suppress the truck keys, wallet, and insurance card, but 
denied his motion to suppress the knife, his statements to the 
police, the DNA evidence, and the eyewitness identifications.  
The District Court found the DNA sample was admissible 
because it was taken after he was arrested and pursuant to 
probable cause.  As to the identifications of both Wrensford 
and Muller, the Court concluded that the identifications were 
not the product of unduly suggestive procedures and denied 
the motions to suppress them.   
 
E 
 
 In addition to the events described above concerning 
the apprehension of Wrensford and Muller, the jury heard 
testimony from Henry Mason, who knew Wrensford, Muller, 
and Hendricks.  Mason testified that he was at Ben’s Car 
Wash on the afternoon of the shooting and observed Muller 
and Wrensford having an altercation with an associate of 
Hendricks.   
 
 Tynicia Teague testified that she was in the Food 
Town parking lot on the night of the shooting and went to the 
police station afterward, but claimed she did not remember 
any details about the shooting or her identification of 
Wrensford.  Portions of her statements to the police, which 
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included her identifications of Wrensford and Muller, and the 
photo array were admitted into evidence.   
 
 The Government presented evidence that 9 mm, .38 
class (9 mm), and .40 caliber bullet casings were found at the 
scene of the shooting or in the truck.  The jury also heard 
evidence that a 9 mm Smith & Wesson was found where 
Wrensford was stopped, his DNA was found on the weapon, 
and the 9 mm casings found at the scene were fired from that 
gun.   
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 After hearing the evidence, instructions, and 
summations, the jury found Wrensford guilty on Counts I-V 
and Muller guilty on Counts I, IV, and V.  Defendants asked 
to poll the jury.   
 
 All jurors, including Juror 7, initially responded that 
the verdict was their independent verdict, but after Juror 7 
replied regarding Count IV as to Wrensford, Wrensford’s 
counsel stated that he did not hear a response.  The Court 
asked again whether it was Juror 7’s independent verdict, and 
she responded “Yes.  Yes.”  App. 2506.  Wrensford’s counsel 
stated that he saw Juror 7 “shrug [ ] her shoulders” and heard 
no response to the question on Count IV and that he “barely 
heard a verbal response from her” as to Count III.  App. 
2506-07.  Wrensford’s counsel sought a declaration that the 
verdict was not unanimous or, in the alternative, that Juror 7 
be repolled; Muller’s counsel also said that he did not hear 
Juror 7 and that she should be repolled.   
 
 The District Court continued polling the remaining 
jurors on Count V as to Wrensford, without objection, to 
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which the jurors responded that it was their unanimous 
verdict, and Juror 7 was then re-polled on Counts III and IV 
as to Wrensford and the following ensued:   
 
The Clerk: Juror No. 7, we were unable 
to hear your response as to Count III.  Is this 
your independent verdict? 
The Juror: Yes. 
The Clerk: As to Count IV, is this your 
independent verdict? 
The Juror: Yes. 
The Clerk: Yes? I can’t hear you. 
The Juror: Yes. 
The Clerk: And that was as to Wrensford 
on both counts.  Is this your independent 
verdict? 
The Juror: No. 
The Court: As to Wrensford? As to 
Count III? 
The Juror: No. 
The Court: As to Count IV? 
The Juror: No. 
 
App. 2516.  After a sidebar, the Court decided to continue 
polling as to Muller, and defense counsel did not object.  On 
Count I as to Muller, Juror 7 stated that it was not her 
independent verdict.  The Court continued polling the 
remaining jurors on that count without objection.  After 
asking counsel “whether we poll with respect to all the other 
counts, or we determine, at this point, whether some other 
course of action is appropriate,” App. 2520, Muller and 
Wrensford moved for mistrials on the grounds that there 
would be too much pressure on Juror 7 if the jury were 
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directed to redeliberate.  Muller also asked to continue polling 
as to the other counts.  The District Court continued the poll 
and all jurors, including Juror 7, stated that those guilty 
verdicts against Muller (on Counts IV and V) were their 
independent verdicts.   
 
 Wrensford moved for a mistrial as to Counts III and IV 
and Muller moved for a mistrial as to all counts.  In response, 
the District Court excused the jury to discuss with the parties 
whether it should deliver a jury instruction directing the jury 
to redeliberate on Counts III and IV for Wrensford and Count 
I for Muller.  Defendants reiterated their positions and 
motions.  The Court decided to have the jurors redeliberate on 
those counts and gave a supplemental instruction telling the 
jury, among other things, that it was desirable to reach a 
verdict but emphasizing that the jurors should not surrender 
their convictions and that the verdict must reflect the 
conscientious judgment of each juror.2  After deliberating 
                                                                
2 The District Court instructed the jury as 
follows: 
 
 Now, let me remind you of a couple of 
things as you go back for these further 
deliberations.  It is your duty as jurors to 
consult with one another and to deliberate with 
a view to reaching an agreement if you can do 
so without violence to individual judgment.  
Each of you must decide the case for yourself.  
But do so only after an impartial consideration 
of the evidence in the case with your fellow 
jurors. 
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 In the course of your deliberations, do 
not hesitate to reexamine your own views and 
change your opinion if convinced that your 
view is erroneous, but do not surrender your 
honest conviction as to the weight or effect of 
evidence solely because of the opinion of your 
fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of 
returning a verdict.  It is desirable if a verdict 
can be reached, but your verdict must reflect the 
conscientious judgment of each juror.  Under no 
circumstances must any juror yield his 
conscientious judgment.   
 
 You’re reminded also that the 
government bears the burden of proving each 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Do not ever change your mind just 
because the other jurors see something 
differently, or just to get the case over with.  As 
I’ve told you before, in the end your vote must 
be exactly that, your own vote.  And as 
important as it is for you to reach a unanimous 
agreement, it is just as important that you do so 
honestly and in good conscience.   
 
 So with that, by way of supplemental 
instruction, I will ask that you return to the jury 
room and deliberate further on the particular 
counts that I have mentioned, that is Count I for 
Mr. Muller, which is Possession of a Firearm in 
a School Zone; and Counts III and IV for Mr. 
Wrensford, Possession of a Firearm with an 
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again, the jury returned a guilty verdict against Wrensford on 
Counts III and IV and against Muller on Count I.  The jury 
was polled again, and all jurors, including Juror 7, replied 
“Yes,” that it was their independent verdict, on all counts.  
App. 2566-70.  Wrensford was thus convicted on Counts I-V, 
and Muller was convicted on Counts I, IV, and V.   
 
Wrensford moved for a new trial, and Muller moved 
for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial.  Defendants 
challenged the Court’s pre-trial suppression orders, the 
evidentiary rulings made at trial that allowed out-of-court 
identifications into evidence, and the Court’s refusal to 
declare a mistrial after a juror indicated that the verdict did 
not represent her individual verdict, and Muller asserted that 
the evidence was insufficient to convict him.  The District 
Court denied these motions.   
 
 Wrensford and Muller appeal.   
 
                                                                                                                                               
Obliterated Serial Number, is Count III, and 
Murder in the First Degree is Count IV, with 
the lesser included offense, Second Degree 
Murder, as part of Count IV as well. 
 
 So with that, I ask you to return to the 
jury room for further deliberations.  Thank you. 
 
App. 2562-63. 
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II3 
 
A 
 
 Wrensford argues that the District Court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress because his involuntary 
transportation to the police station and detention in a cell 
constituted an arrest without probable cause, in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.  We agree and conclude that 
Wrensford’s transportation to C Command and placement in 
a cell was a de facto arrest.4   
 
 The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  A “seizure” occurs 
when, “taking into account all of the circumstances 
surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have 
communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at 
liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his 
business.”  Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Absent some 
exception, evidence obtained as a result of an illegal seizure, 
                                                                
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c).  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
4 We “review[ ] the District Court’s denial of a motion 
to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual 
findings and exercise[ ] plenary review of the District Court’s 
application of the law to those facts.”  United States v. Perez, 
280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).   
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including evidence obtained by consent tainted by the illegal 
seizure, is inadmissible.  See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 
507-08 (1983).  
 
 Depending on the facts, involuntary transportation to a 
police station or other custodial setting can be deemed a de 
facto arrest.  See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) 
(holding that an illegal arrest occurred when the defendant 
was transported, without probable cause, from his home to the 
police station for fingerprinting, and that “the line is crossed 
when the police, without probable cause or a warrant, forcibly 
remove a person from his home or other place in which he is 
entitled to be and transport him to the police station, where he 
is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes”); 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 494-95, 504-07 (plurality opinion) 
(holding that the defendant had been subjected to an illegal 
arrest when, after detectives requested and did not return his 
airline ticket and driver’s license, he was asked to come with 
the officers from the concourse into an “interrogation room” 
approximately 40 feet away, where his suitcases were 
searched); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207, 212, 
216 (1979) (concluding that the police violated the Fourth 
Amendment when, without probable cause, they seized the 
defendant from a neighbor’s home and transported him to the 
police station for interrogation without telling him he was free 
to go); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724-28 (1969) 
(ruling that an unreasonable seizure occurred when police 
brought the defendant to the police station without probable 
cause, a warrant, or his consent for fingerprinting and brief 
questioning before he was released); see also Kaupp v. Texas, 
538 U.S. 626, 631-33 (2003) (per curiam) (holding that police 
executed an illegal arrest when they took a teenage suspect 
from his home and brought him, in handcuffs, to the police 
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station for questioning); Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 
1491 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing Dunaway’s holding “that the 
‘reasonable suspicion’ which permits a limited stop under 
Terry v. Ohio . . . is not enough to allow the police to 
transport the person stopped to the police station and extract 
information through detention and interrogation” (citation 
omitted)).   
 
 Other appellate courts have also concluded that 
transportation to and detention in a police station or other 
custodial setting constitutes a de facto arrest.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(holding that, under Royer, the defendant was arrested when 
“he was prevented from boarding his plane, placed in 
handcuffs, involuntarily transported (in restraints) to an 
official holding area some distance from the place of the 
original stop, confined to a small interrogation room and kept 
there under observation for more than a momentary period; 
yet he was never informed how long he would be detained 
nor told that he was not under arrest”); Centanni v. Eight 
Unknown Officers, 15 F.3d 587, 589, 591-92 (6th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that taking an individual who was not suspected of 
any crime to a police station and into an interview room, and 
detaining her for approximately four hours where it was made 
clear she was not free to leave, violated the Fourth 
Amendment); United States v. Obasa, 15 F.3d 603, 608 (6th 
Cir. 1994) (ruling that an illegal arrest occurred when officers 
stopped a cab in which the defendant was riding on an 
interstate highway, read him his Miranda rights, and brought 
him to an airport police station in a police cruiser, and noting 
that “[w]hile [the defendant] was not taken from his home to 
the police station, he was taken ‘forcibly’ from a public place 
where he had a right to be”); United States v. Ceballos, 812 
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F.2d 42, 45-46, 48-50 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating that an illegal 
arrest occurred when the defendant was asked to accompany 
agents to a field office, the agents did not convey that he had 
a choice in the matter, and he was then placed “in a small, 
locked interview room” and questioned for several hours); 
United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1055 (5th Cir. 
1987) (stating that “[t]he removal of the suspect from the 
scene of the stop to police headquarters usually marks the 
point at which an investigative stop becomes a de facto 
arrest,” but concluding that the officer had probable cause at 
the time he transported the defendant to the station); United 
States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 
1985) (holding that having the defendant follow an officer to 
a police station “three to four miles away,” after the officer 
had asked for and retained the defendant’s driver’s license, 
registration, and title was not permissible as part of a Terry 
stop, and stating that “we understand the Hayes decision as 
eliminating the option of forcing the suspect to go to the 
police station from the alternatives available to the officer 
during an investigative detention”); United States v. Moreno, 
742 F.2d 532, 534, 535-36 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
escorting the defendant from a baggage claim area to a DEA 
office approximately 75 yards away was an arrest, and that 
his consent to the search of his bag in that office was tainted 
by the illegal seizure).  Not every transportation by police, 
however, constitutes an arrest.  See United States v. 
McCargo, 464 F.3d 192, 197-99 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding 
that officers acted reasonably in transporting the defendant in 
a police car from the location he was apprehended, which was 
approximately 200 feet from the crime scene, back to the 
crime scene for potential identification by the victim). 
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 There is no doubt that Wrensford was subjected to a de 
facto arrest when the police transported him from the place he 
was stopped to the police station and placed him in a cell.  
Upon finding him near the ballpark approximately one hour 
after the shooting, Cruz drew his gun, ordered Wrensford to 
show his hands, ordered him to the ground, and placed him in 
handcuffs.  After Cruz patted him down and removed his 
knife, keys, wallet, and insurance card, Wrensford was placed 
in a police car and transported to C Command.  Wrensford 
was never told he was free to leave or that he did not have to 
come to the station.  Once at the station, Wrensford was 
placed in a cell.  Wrensford was then taken from C Command 
to Rainbow Building where he was formally arrested at 1:30 
a.m.  The “line” between an investigative stop and a de facto 
arrest was certainly “crossed” when the police forcibly 
removed Wrensford from a place he was entitled to be and 
transported him to the police station and detained him in a 
cell, and, under the precedent, could have been crossed even 
before he was placed in the cell.  Hayes, 470 U.S. at 816.  Put 
simply, the involuntary transportation to the police station and 
placement in a custodial setting thereafter constituted a de 
facto arrest.  Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 216.  We need not decide 
at exactly which point along the timeline here Wrensford was 
de facto arrested because on these facts, it is clear that he was 
subjected to a de facto arrest once he was put in a cell.   
 
 The Government argues that transporting and 
detaining Wrensford was not a de facto arrest, and probable 
cause was not required, because detaining him was 
reasonably necessary to continue an active investigation into 
the shooting.  Certain investigatory seizures are permissible 
under the Fourth Amendment if there is a reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about 
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to commit a crime.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 27 (1968).  
In addition, “there are undoubtedly reasons of safety and 
security that would justify moving a suspect from one 
location to another during an investigatory detention . . . .”  
Royer, 460 U.S. at 504.  The record, however, does not 
indicate that Wrensford was moved from the street and 
detained in a cell out of a concern for the officers’ or the 
public’s safety or security.  Rather, as Cruz testified, 
Wrensford was taken to C Command for investigation and, 
specifically, to verify whether Wrensford was the same 
person who fled from Mendez and to allow the case agent, 
Matthews, to question him.   
 
 Because Wrensford was arrested when he was taken to 
C Command and placed in a custodial setting, and the 
Government concedes that the officers did not have probable 
cause to arrest Wrensford at that time, we next consider 
whether the evidence obtained following the de facto arrest 
must be suppressed.   
 
 The police recovered several things after the de facto 
arrest: Tynicia Teague’s identifications of Wrensford, as well 
as Wrensford’s license, a statement, and DNA sample.  This 
evidence must be suppressed unless the Government can 
demonstrate an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirements such as the independent source, inevitable 
discovery, or attenuation doctrines, or the good faith 
exception.  See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) 
(“[T]he burden of showing admissibility rests, of course, on 
the prosecution.”); United States v. Pellulo, 173 F.3d 131, 
136 (3d Cir. 1999) (collecting cases).  Because the District 
Court found the detention proper, it did not determine 
whether any exception applied, including whether there were 
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“intervening events [that] broke the connection” between 
Wrensford’s illegal arrest, on the one hand, and Tynicia 
Teague’s statement and identification, Wrensford’s statement, 
and his DNA sample, on the other hand  Dunaway, 442 U.S. 
at 219.5  Because we do not have the benefit of the District 
Court’s view on whether any exception to the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirements applies to the challenged 
evidence, we will remand to the District Court for it to 
examine whether the evidence gathered after the de facto 
arrest is subject to such an exception and hence is admissible.   
 
 For these reasons, we will remand to the District Court 
to determine whether the evidence gathered following the de 
facto arrest is admissible.  See Kaupp, 538 U.S. at 633 
(stating that the defendant’s confession must be suppressed 
“[u]nless, on remand, the State can point to testimony 
undisclosed on the record before us, and weighty enough to 
carry the State’s burden” to show there was “‘any meaningful 
intervening event’ between the illegal arrest and [defendant’s] 
confession” (quoting Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691 
(1982)); cf. United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 180-83 
(3d Cir. 2002) (where the Government asked to reopen before 
our Court, remanding to the district court to evaluate whether 
the Government should be permitted to reopen the 
                                                                
5 To make a determination on potential intervening 
events, courts may consider, among other things, whether the 
evidence was “obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest,” 
the “temporal proximity between the arrest and” collection of 
the evidence, “the presence of intervening circumstances, and 
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct . . . .”  Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04.   
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suppression hearing).6  If the evidence obtained was not 
subject to an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s 
requirements, then it is inadmissible.  Royer, 460 U.S. at 507-
08; Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-05.  If the evidence is deemed 
inadmissible, then the District Court must determine whether 
its admission was nevertheless harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  United States v. Schaefer, 691 F.2d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 
1982).  If the District Court deems the evidence inadmissible 
and determines that its admission was not harmless beyond a 
                                                                
6 Whether the Government will be permitted to reopen 
the suppression hearing following remand to offer evidence 
will be subject to the District Court’s discretion and will 
require consideration of, among other things, whether 
Wrensford will be prejudiced.  Whether a defendant will be 
prejudiced depends on whether he will have an opportunity to 
respond and rebut the evidence.  Coward, 296 F.3d at 181 
(quoting United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 741 (6th 
Cir. 1985)).  Courts also consider the timeliness of the motion 
to reopen, the nature of the evidence, the reason why the 
evidence was not initially presented, and whether the timing 
of its presentation will distort its importance.  Id. (quoting 
Blankenship, 775 F.2d at 741).  As to the reasons for the 
failure to present the evidence, courts may consider how the 
new evidence came to light and whether the law was 
unsettled or unclear at the time of the initial proceedings.  Id. 
at 182.  Reopening may also be permitted to allow the 
presentation of evidence about a technical matter “overlooked 
by inadvertence.”  Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).  
In Coward, our Court concluded that the district court should 
evaluate the Government’s reasons for seeking to reopen, 
including whether it provides a “reasonable and adequate 
explanation for its failure to present” evidence.  Id. 
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reasonable doubt, then it should grant Wrensford a new trial.  
Otherwise, it shall reinstate the verdict.7 
 
 As to Muller, however, we reach a different 
conclusion.  Muller presented no argument that the District 
Court erred in denying Wrensford’s motion to suppress or 
that the District Court abused its discretion in admitting the 
eyewitness identifications, but rather “adopt[ed] and 
incorporate[ed] by reference all four . . . arguments made by 
Appellant Wrensford in his brief.”  Appellant Muller’s Br. 42.  
Although there are circumstances where a party may adopt 
the arguments of a co-party in a consolidated case, see Fed. 
R. App. P. 28(i), Muller specifically disclaimed at oral 
argument reliance on an argument that Tynicia Teague’s 
identification was the fruit of the poisonous tree, Oral Arg. 
Recording at 17:15-18:33, available at 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/16-
1373USAv.Wrensford.mp3.  Moreover, the arguments 
Wrensford made have nothing to do with Muller.  Indeed, 
Tynicia Teague’s identification of Muller arose from different 
facts and involves applying some different legal principles 
from those applicable to her identification of Wrensford.  
Thus, Muller cannot pursue his appeal of the suppression 
ruling against him by adopting Wrensford’s suppression 
arguments. 
 
                                                                
7 Because we are remanding and the findings on 
remand may impact the admissibility of Tynicia Teague’s 
out-of-court identification, we need not address Wrensford’s 
argument that the District Court erred in admitting her out-of-
court identification. 
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B 
 
 We next consider whether the District Court erred in 
denying the motions for mistrials based on non-unanimous 
jury verdicts.  We review a district court’s actions concerning 
jury polling for abuse of discretion.  Virgin Islands v. 
Hercules, 875 F.2d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 1989).  Our Court has 
adopted “a rule vesting discretion in the trial court” because 
“a trial judge is in the best position to weigh the 
circumstances peculiar to each trial and determine whether a 
poll coerced a juror into acquiescing in the majority’s 
demands.”  United States v. Fiorilla, 850 F.2d 172, 176 (3d 
Cir. 1988). 
 
 A jury verdict in a federal criminal trial must be 
unanimous.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a); United States v. Scalzitti, 
578 F.2d 507, 512 (3d Cir. 1978).  A defendant has the right 
to poll the jury after it returns its verdict, and if the poll 
reflects a lack of unanimity, a district court may direct the 
jury to redeliberate or may declare a mistrial.  Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 31(d); Hercules, 875 F.2d at 417-18 & n.6.  Specifically, 
Rule 31(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides: 
 
After a verdict is returned but before the jury is 
discharged, the court must on a party’s request, 
or may on its own, poll the jurors individually.  
If the poll reveals a lack of unanimity, the court 
may direct the jury to deliberate further or may 
declare a mistrial and discharge the jury. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(d).  We consider several factors to 
determine whether the method of polling and redeliberation 
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created an impermissibly coercive environment for the 
dissenting juror(s).  Those factors include: (1) whether 
counsel objected to continued polling after a juror voiced 
disagreement with the verdict; (2) whether the trial involves 
multiple counts and/or multiple defendants; (3) the nature of 
the court’s supplemental instruction, if any; and (4) any 
evidence showing that the dissenting juror’s will may have 
been overborne.  See Fiorilla, 850 F.2d at 176-77; see also 
United States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822, 832 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(addressing specific challenges to a jury poll). 
 
 A consideration of these factors shows that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in continuing to poll and in 
instructing the jury to continue deliberating.  First, the record 
shows that Defendants moved for a mistrial when polling 
showed a lack of unanimity, but did not object to further 
polling when Juror 7 dissented.  Once Wrensford’s counsel 
said he did not hear Juror 7 respond when she was polled on 
Count IV and that he barely heard her respond on Count III, 
counsel for both Defendants requested she be repolled.  The 
Court continued polling on Count V without objection and 
then returned to Counts III and IV, and Juror 7 responded that 
those verdicts were not her independent verdicts.  The Court 
then, without objection, polled the jurors with respect to 
Muller, including all jurors on Count I.  Both Defendants 
moved for mistrials, but Muller then requested that polling 
continue as to the other counts—and on those Counts, IV and 
V, all jurors reported that the verdicts were their independent 
verdicts.  Thus, although polling revealed Juror 7 as the lone 
dissenter, and Defendants argued for mistrials and asserted 
that Juror 7 would be subjected to a coercive atmosphere if 
the jury were sent back to deliberate, they did not object to 
the continued polling.  Because Defendants failed to object to 
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the continued polling, their silence deprived the District Court 
of an opportunity to consider their views about continuing the 
poll, and thus we are hard-pressed to say that the District 
Court abused its discretion when it had no objection to rule 
upon.   
 
 Second, this case involved two defendants who were 
each tried for multiple counts.  The District Court justifiably 
had an interest in continuing to poll as to all counts to obtain 
at least a partial verdict.  Indeed, it is appropriate to repoll a 
jury to attempt “to take partial verdicts wherever possible in a 
relatively complex, multi-count, multi-defendant criminal 
prosecution.”  Fiorilla, 850 F.2d at 177.  Thus, we do not fault 
the District Court for confirming unanimity as to any and all 
counts.   
 
 Third, in its instruction to the jury before it 
recommenced its deliberations, the District Court told the jury 
that reaching a verdict is desirable, reminded the jurors that 
their verdict “must reflect the conscientious judgment of each 
juror,” and said that “[u]nder no circumstances must any juror 
yield his conscientious judgment.”  App. 2562-63.  These 
warnings “removed any possibility that the supplemental 
charge could be considered [ ] coercive.”  United States v. 
Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 193 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Fiorilla, 
850 F.2d at 176-77 (noting that “[b]efore deliberations 
resumed the next day, the trial judge delivered a cautionary 
instruction asking the jurors to carefully weigh and consider 
the views of their fellow jurors”); cf. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 
484 U.S. 231, 234-35, 241 (1988) (concluding that there was 
no coercion when the jury was sent back to deliberate as to 
sentencing, where the district court provided a cautionary 
instruction after one juror answered in the negative to the 
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court’s question whether further deliberations would enable 
each juror to arrive at a verdict).  The instruction, therefore, 
served to prevent coercion. 
 
 Fourth, there is no evidence that Juror 7’s will was 
overborne during redeliberation such that she was coerced 
into agreeing with the guilty verdicts on Counts III and IV for 
Wrensford and Count I for Muller.  The record does not show 
any doubt on her part when the court polled the jury after 
redeliberation.   
 
 Considering these factors together, we conclude that 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in polling, 
reinstructing the jury, and having the jury redeliberate.  Thus, 
the motions for mistrials were properly denied. 
 
C 
 
 We next address the assertion that the District Court 
erred in refusing to give a voluntary manslaughter jury 
instruction.   
 
 We review a district court’s refusal to give a certain 
jury instruction for abuse of discretion.  Virgin Islands v. 
Isaac, 50 F.3d 1175, 1180 (3d Cir. 1995).  A court acts within 
its discretion in declining to give an instruction where the 
requested instruction lacks “rational support in the evidence.”  
Bishop v. Mazurkiewicz, 634 F.2d 724, 725 (3d Cir. 1980).  
Moreover, the Constitution does not “require a jury 
instruction on lesser included offenses where the evidence 
does not support it.”  Id.   
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 Here, Defendants asked the District Court to provide a 
voluntary manslaughter instruction.  Voluntary manslaughter 
under Virgin Islands law requires proof that: (1) the defendant 
unlawfully killed another; (2) the defendant did so without 
malice aforethought; (3) the killing occurred “upon a sudden 
quarrel or in the heat of passion”; and (4) the defendant had 
done the act “either with an intent to kill or an intent to inflict 
serious or grievous bodily injury that would likely cause or 
result in death.”  Isaac, 50 F.3d at 1179; see also Virgin 
Islands v. Knight, 764 F. Supp. 1042, 1049 (D. V.I. 1991) 
(listing the same elements); 14 V.I. Code Ann. § 924 
(defining voluntary manslaughter).   
 
 The evidence does not support a voluntary 
manslaughter instruction in this case.  Crucially, that offense 
requires proof that the defendant killed upon a sudden quarrel 
or in the heat of passion.  Isaac, 50 F.3d at 1179.  Witnesses 
testified that an altercation between Wrensford and 
Hendricks’s associate occurred hours before the shooting, and 
Muller attempts to suggest that this provoked the shooting but 
does so without any evidentiary basis.  As a result, there was 
no “rational support” in the record for a necessary element of 
voluntary manslaughter, Bishop, 634 F.2d at 725, and hence, 
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
give the voluntary manslaughter instruction.   
 
D 
 
 Finally, we turn to Muller’s argument that there was 
insufficient evidence to support his convictions for possession 
of a firearm in a school zone (Count I), first degree murder 
(Count IV), and unauthorized possession of a firearm (Count 
V).  He argues that the evidence was insufficient to find that 
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he “had anything to do with the death of Gilbert Hendricks, 
Jr.” and insufficient “to convict [him] on any count.”  
Appellant Muller’s Br. 32, 37.  In other words, he advances a 
theory of misidentification and not the insufficiency of the 
evidence as to any particular element or count.  Thus, we 
review the record to determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to show his involvement in the shooting. 
 
 Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence is 
“highly deferential.”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 
726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013).  “We do not weigh 
evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses in making 
this determination.”  United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 
163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).  Rather, we view 
the evidence as a whole and “ask whether it is strong enough 
for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 430 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. 
Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851, 852 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that we 
examine the “totality of the evidence, both direct and 
circumstantial” and credit “all available inferences in favor of 
the government” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).   
 
 The evidence here was sufficient to prove Muller’s 
role in Hendricks’s murder.  First, Mason testified that Muller 
was at Ben’s Car Wash on the afternoon of May 10, where he 
became involved in an altercation with an associate of 
Hendricks.  Second, Tynicia Teague viewed a photo array and 
identified Muller as the driver of the truck from which the 
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shooter shot Hendricks.8  Although she did not identify 
Muller in court and claimed not to remember any of the 
details of the shooting, and she testified only to witnessing a 
shooting at Food Town involving men in a red truck, she 
authenticated her May 13 statement and photo array 
identifying Muller as “[t]he guy . . . driving the red truck 
Thursday night, May 10, 2012, during the shooting incident 
in front of Food Town grocery,” Muller Supp. App. 2, and 
                                                                
8 Muller makes a passing reference to the District 
Court’s admission of eyewitness testimony offered against 
him, but this is insufficient to avoid waiving the challenge, 
see Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 677 F.3d 
519, 545 (3d Cir. 2012).  Even if Muller did not waive this 
argument, it fails because the procedures employed with 
respect to the photo array were not unduly suggestive.  
Tynicia Teague had seen Muller several times in the past and 
identified him as the truck’s driver from a six-photo array 
during an interview with police at a restaurant on May 13, 
2012.  As Defendants’ expert in the field of cognitive 
psychology, memory, and eyewitness identification testified 
at trial, the photo array contained “five additional 
photographs that were similar in appearance to Mr. Muller.  
And that’s the proper procedure for conducting an 
identification.”  App. 2272.  These procedures were not 
unduly suggestive, and the District Court did not err in 
admitting Tynicia Teague’s identification of Muller.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 133-34 (3d Cir. 
2014) (holding that a photo array in which “all of the men in 
the array were of similar age; there was no striking difference 
in the amount of head hair each had; and the skin color of the 
members of the array was not strikingly different” was not 
impermissibly suggestive). 
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both were admitted as substantive evidence, see Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(1)(C); United States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419, 425-26 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  The jury also heard that, at various times prior to 
the shooting, Tynicia Teague had seen Muller with the 
shooter.  Third, Muller provided inconsistent stories to his co-
workers and grandfather in the wake of the shooting.  Muller 
asked to stay with his grandfather after the shooting and told 
his grandfather he was feeling ill and that he planned to see a 
doctor in New York.  However, over those same days he did 
not inform his supervisors of any medical issues and did not 
tell them that he planned to leave St. Croix.  Fourth, when 
met by Customs and Border Patrol agents in the San Juan 
airport, Muller “lowered his head and shoulders” and “said 
that’s okay.  I figured somebody was going to pick [me] up,” 
App. 1544, and, when asked whether he knew about any 
issues pending in St. Croix, Muller “broke down crying,” 
App. 1545, suggesting a consciousness of guilt.  Based upon 
the witnesses who placed him with the shooter on the day of 
the shooting and at other times, Tynicia Teague’s 
identification of him as the driver of the truck from which the 
shooter shot Hendricks, and his conduct after the shooting, 
there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of 
fact could find that Muller was involved in the shooting of 
Hendricks and thus sufficient evidence existed to support his 
convictions.9 
                                                                
9 Muller also argues that he should be granted a new 
trial because the verdict is contrary to the evidence, the 
verdict was less than unanimous, and justice requires a new 
trial.  Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a) provides that 
a court “may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the 
interest of justice so requires.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a).  We 
review the denial of a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
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III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, with respect to Wrensford, 
we will vacate and remand for the District Court to determine 
whether the identification, Wrensford’s statements, and the 
DNA evidence obtained following his de facto arrest are 
admissible.  We will affirm the District Court’s other rulings, 
including the judgment against Muller.  
                                                                                                                                               
33 for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 
993, 1005 (3d Cir. 2008).  “Such motions are not favored and 
should be granted sparingly and only in exceptional cases.”  
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  For the 
reasons stated herein, Muller has not established any basis for 
a new trial.  We will therefore affirm the District Court’s 
denial of his motion for a new trial.   
